


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CIA/ SAVA /WVIND 700606



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 6 June 1970

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.


For the President Only

~~Top Secret~~

SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1970

Weekly average for each month




FEBRUARY - MAY 1970

Weekly data as reported


US BATTLE DEATHS

dropped sharply to 118 from last week's 165.




SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS

continued to rise to 418 over last week's 368. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than figures released to the press by the GVN.




INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE

stand at one small specialist group with a strength of 75. The total number of infiltrators since 23 October 1969 is now estimated at some 60,000 - 61,500.




ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS

reflected the anticipated upsurge in enemy activity as they numbered 973 vice last week's 907 and were mainly of a harassing nature.




ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION

declined to 1,869 under last week's 2,354.



SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS

as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by RVN forces was 66% compared to last week's high of 72%.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

In South Vietnam, the anticipated final phase of the Communists' spring campaign, consisting largely of shelling attacks in I, II, and IV Corps occurred between 3 and 5 June. Similar attacks were cycled at the beginning of April and May. Although each series of attacks has generally declined in scope and intensity, due largely to internal difficulties and Allied pre-emptive actions, the current round was marked by a Communist thrust into Dalat which seems to have been designed to garner international headlines more than to achieve any significant military victory or advantage. The enemy will undoubtedly continue harassment of pacification and Vietnamization as opportunities arise.

In north Laos, a government guerrilla battalion suffered heavy casualties and lost ground during a Communist attack west of the Plain of Jars. The irregulars, however, were reinforced and quickly regained the lost positions and continued to make modest advances. To the south, Saravane has fallen (9 June) but friendly forces maintain their positions near Attapeu despite recent heavy shellings and company-size ground attacks. The holding of friendly positions and interdiction of Communist supply routes over and around the Bolovens Plateau now becomes extremely tenuous.

In Cambodia, Communist forces continue to deploy westward and to press their attacks on population centers in the north. (Communist forces are also harassing Siem Reap in attacks that began after this memo's reporting period technically closed. The situation at Siem Reap and Angkor is murky, but the Communists apparently held one of Siem Reap's two airstrips, the one they held being Cambodia's only jet capable strip other than the international airport at Phnom Penh.) Allied forces involved in cross-border operations are still encountering only light opposition as it is becoming increasingly clear that enemy main force units have withdrawn deeper into Cambodia and intend to remain well out of the way of the Allies.

Enemy Infiltration

Infiltration returned to a low level after a surge last week of nearly 3,000 infiltrators. Only one small "QL" or specialist group of 75 was detected during the past week, however, large-scale troop movements to the south may be imminent. Recent enemy messages suggest that a fairly heavy input into the pipeline will be made at least through June. The total estimate of infiltrators since 23 October 1969 remains at 60,000 - 61,500.

South Vietnam Developments

Although no formal treaties were signed, Vice President Ky brought back a number of requests and recommendations from the Cambodian government as a result of his 4-6 June official visit to Phnom Penh. Among these were a request that ARVN establish a permanent base at Neak Luong from which GVN reaction forces would operate, that a 15-kilometer zone be established on both sides of the border in which forces of both countries would operate freely, that the GVN agree to intervene militarily in western Cambodia when requested by the Cambodians, and that the GVN proceed immediately with a comprehensive training program for FANK. Understandings also were reached on the need to limit the number of Vietnamese refugees, for closer screening of Viet Cong suspects among the refugees and for measures to control the problem of ARVN relations with the Cambodian population. Ky is reported to be extremely pleased with the outcome of his visit and he believes that the warmth and enthusiasm with which he was met at all levels of the government augurs well for future relations between the two countries.

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25X1X7

Communist Developments

_____ has shed further light on the Soviet attitude toward recognition of Sihanouk's government.

_____ the Soviets had resisted North Vietnam's insistence that they recognize the Sihanouk government, adding that the USSR would wait to see whether the Prince continued to allow himself to be used to advance Chinese interests which did not accord with those of the Soviets. Meanwhile, the Polish and Rumanian representatives

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25X6 reportedly [REDACTED] that the USSR told Le Duan during his visit to Moscow that Chinese sponsorship of Sihanouk would preclude Soviet recognition of Sihanouk's government, but that the USSR would increase its military and economic aid to North Vietnam and permit diversion of some of this assistance to Sihanouk. In addition to concern over the expansion of Chinese influence in Cambodia, which has been expressed by a number of Soviet diplomats, the Soviets probably want to be more certain of Sihanouk's prospects before burning their bridges to Phnom Penh.

The departure of Madame Binh, the Viet Cong Foreign Minister, leaves no high-level delegate in either of the Communist delegations in Paris. While careful not to scuttle the talks completely, the Communists clearly see no prospects for meaningful negotiations in this forum under present circumstances.

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